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We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to
determine whether neural activity can differentiate between true
memory, false memory, and deception. Subjects heard a series of
semantically related words and were later asked to make
a recognition judgment of old words, semantically related non-
studied words (lures for false recognition), and unrelated new
words. They were also asked to make a deceptive response to half
of the old and unrelated new words. There were 3 main ﬁndings.
First, consistent with the notion that executive function supports
deception, 2 types of deception (pretending to know and pretending
not to know) recruited prefrontal activity. Second, consistent with
the sensory reactivation hypothesis, the difference between true
recognition and false recognition was found in the left temporo-
parietal regions probably engaged in the encoding of auditorily
presented words. Third, the left prefrontal cortex was activated
during pretending to know relative to correct rejection and false
recognition, whereas the right anterior hippocampus was activated
during false recognition relative to correct rejection and pretending
to know. These ﬁndings indicate that fMRI can detect the
difference in brain activity between deception and false memory
despite the fact that subjects respond with ‘‘I know’’ to novel
events in both processes.
Keywords: false recognition, fMRI, lying, medial temporal lobe,
prefrontal cortex
Introduction
The development of neuroimaging techniques has enabled us
directly to measure brain activity associated with various
cognitive functions. In recent years, much attention has been
paid not only to clarifying the neural correlates of cognitive
processes but also to ascertaining what someone is currently
thinking by analyzing patterns of neural activity (Haynes and
Rees 2006). In the context of this ‘‘brain reading,’’ discrimina-
tion between honest and deceptive responses is one of the
most interesting topics in cognitive neuroscience.
The neural correlates of deception have gradually been
delineated in studies using positron emission tomography (Abe
et al. 2006, 2007), functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI; Spence et al. 2001; Langleben et al. 2002; Lee et al. 2002,
2005; Ganis et al. 2003; Kozel, Padgett, et al. 2004; Kozel, Revell,
et al. 2004; Nunez et al. 2005; Phan et al. 2005; Mohamed et al.
2006; Gamer et al. 2007), event-related potential (Johnson et al.
2003, 2004, 2005, 2008), and, more recently, transcranial direct
current stimulation (Priori et al. 2008). In addition, researchers
have extended their ﬁndings to the application of fMRI or
magnetoencephalography as a lie detector on the level of
individual subjects (Davatzikos et al. 2005; Kozel et al. 2005;
Langleben et al. 2005; Seth et al. 2006). However, it should be
kept in mind that even if we can judge whether or not people
are telling a lie, their ‘‘honest’’ responses do not always reﬂect
‘‘truthful’’ facts because of occasional memory errors.
It is known that human memory is prone to various kinds of
distortions and illusions (Roediger 1996; Schacter 1999; Loftus
2003). Among these memory errors, many researchers have
focused on false recognition, whereby people incorrectly claim
that they have recently seen or heard a stimulus they have not
encountered (Underwood 1965). In contrast to deception,
false recognition is not accompanied by a subjective feeling
that people are responding untruthfully, and therefore
researchers need to be able to detect a difference between
true and false recognition that is not apparent to the conscious
mind. Despite this challenge, many neuroimaging studies have
shown a difference in brain activities related to true and false
recognition (Schacter et al. 1996, 1997; Heun et al. 2000, 2004;
Cabeza et al. 2001; von Zerssen et al. 2001; Okado and Stark
2003; Kahn et al. 2004; Slotnick and Schacter 2004; Umeda et al.
2005; Garoff-Eaton et al. 2006, 2007; Kim and Cabeza 2007).
The main purpose of this study was directly to compare
brain activity related to deception and memory distortion, both
of which conceal the truth. Speciﬁcally, we focused on the
processes of pretending to know (a type of deception) and
false recognition, in both of which people respond ‘‘I know’’ to
novel events. When distinguishing between these processes, it
is not possible to rely on the difference between subjects’
responses or the nature (‘‘novel’’ in this situation) of the stimuli.
The ability to judge objectively the truthfulness of someone’s
word based solely on their brain activations would help us to
improve existing lie-detection systems on both theoretical and
practical bases. In addition, imaging data may provide useful
evidence for those involved in criminal investigation and
prosecution in terms of the credibility of eyewitness testimony
(Wells and Olson 2003). Despite this substantial implication,
there has been no neuroimaging study directly comparing the
patterns of brain activities associated with deception and false
memory.
We performed an event-related fMRI study with a modiﬁed
version of the set of word lists developed by Deese (1959) and
Roediger and McDermott (1995) to produce false recognition
with high probability. Before fMRI scanning, participants heard
a number of lists consisting of semantic associates (e.g., moon,
light, shine, bright, hot, gleam, etc). During a subsequent test
phase with fMRI scanning, subjects were visually presented
with previously studied ‘‘True targets’’ (e.g., hot), nonstudied
‘‘False targets’’ (e.g., sun) that were semantically related to the
studied items (i.e., lures for false recognition), and unrelated
‘‘New targets’’ (e.g., building). The subjects’ task was to make an
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this procedure, the experimental condition of ‘‘Lie’’ was
designed in which participants had to make deceptive
responses to ‘‘True targets’’ and ‘‘New targets’’ (i.e., ‘‘do not
know’’ responses for ‘‘True targets’’ and ‘‘know’’ responses for
‘‘New targets’’).
Before starting this experiment, we presumed the following
hypotheses related to brain activations associated with true
memory, false memory, and deceptive responses. First, we
expected that deception would be associated with increased
brain activity in the lateral prefrontal cortex, which probably
reﬂects executive function such as cognitive control (Spence
et al. 2004; Hughes et al. 2005). Second, we expected that the
regions responsible for auditory processing would be prefer-
entially active during true versus false recognition due to
sensory reactivation (Schacter and Slotnick 2004), because true
memories engage perceptual encoding processes that are
presumably not involved in the creation of false memories. In
fact, recent neuroimaging studies have consistently shown that
the regions engaged in encoding were reactivated during
memory retrieval (e.g., Johnson and Rugg 2007; Ueno et al.
2007). The present experimental paradigm is suitable for this
investigation because the participants were asked to make
a recognition judgment to visually presented words that had
been studied auditorily. Third, we expected that, compared
with false recognition and correct rejection (baseline condition
presenting novel stimuli to participants), the process of
pretending to know would be associated with greater activity
in the lateral prefrontal cortex due to the increased demand of
executive function. Finally, we expected that, compared with
pretending to know and correct rejection, false recognition
would be associated with greater activity in the medial
temporal lobe structures responsible for subjective familiarity
and with no reactivation of regions involved in the sensory
processing of auditory materials.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Twenty-eight volunteers were recruited to take part in this study. The
criteria of recruitment for this study were 1) native Japanese speakers,
2) no history of neurological or psychiatric diseases, and 3) right-
handedness on the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldﬁeld 1971).
All participants gave their written informed consent in accordance with
the Declaration of Helsinki and the guidelines approved by the Ethical
Committee of Tamagawa University.
Stimuli
For false recognition (Deese 1959; Roediger and McDermott 1995), we
collated 81 word lists, each consisting of semantically related words,
from the Japanese literature (Hamajima 2000; Takahashi 2001; Hoshino
2002; Miyaji and Yama 2002). By removing overlapping lists or words
and including some lists with 1 or 2 words from the Japanese word
association norms (Umemoto 1969), we eventually prepared 60 lists of
semantic associates. Of these, 40 lists consisted of 1 theme word (e.g.,
sun) and 15 semantically related words (e.g., moon, light, shine, bright,
hot, and so forth), and the remaining 20 lists consisted of 1 theme word
and 10 semantically related words.
During 2 study phases, a total of 600 words (40 lists of 15 words
each) prerecorded by a male speaker were presented to the
participants through a personal computer.
During 2 test phases, a total of 200 words (80 ‘‘True targets,’’ 40
‘‘False targets,’’ and 80 ‘‘New targets’’) were presented. The 1st and
2nd strongest associates were used as ‘‘True targets’’ and the theme
words as ‘‘False targets’’ in the 40 lists of 15 words each. In addition, the
theme word and the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd strongest associates were used as
‘‘New targets’’ in the 20 lists of 10 words each. These stimuli were
visually presented to participants in the MRI scanner. Each test word
was presented in the center of a screen, and whichever ﬁnger of the
right hand was to be used for old/new button pressing was presented
on both sides of the word. All the ‘‘False targets’’ and half of the ‘‘True
targets’’ and ‘‘New targets’’ were assigned to ‘‘Truth’’ blocks, in which
subjects were asked to respond honestly to each stimulus. The
remaining halves of the ‘‘True targets’’ and ‘‘New targets’’ were assigned
to ‘‘Lie’’ blocks, in which subjects were asked to make a deceptive
response to each stimulus. Due to the limited number of stimuli, ‘‘False
targets’’ were not presented in the ‘‘Lie’’ blocks.
Tasks
The experiment consisted of 2 sessions, each of which included 1 study
phase and 1 test phase (i.e., the 1st study phase without fMRI, the
1st test phase with fMRI, the 2nd study phase without fMRI, and
the 2nd test phase with fMRI). Figure 1 illustrates 1 of the 2 task
sessions.
Before the experiment, the participants were given a thorough
explanation of the task procedure, and familiarized with the task by
completing a short practice session. During each study phase, subjects
listened to a total of 300 words (20 lists of 15 words each) at a rate of
2 s per word. The theme words from the 20 lists were not presented
during the study phase and were used as ‘‘False targets’’ for producing
false recognition in the subsequent test phase. Words were presented
in order of decreasing strength of association with the theme word,
except for 2 words to be used as ‘‘True targets,’’ which were shifted to
positions other than 1, 2, 14, and 15 to prevent primacy and recency
effects. Subjects were instructed to remember the presented words for
the later recognition memory test. Presentation of each list was
separated by a 15-s interval during which subjects performed simple
arithmetic (e.g., ‘‘5 plus 2’’). The presentation order of the lists was
randomized across subjects.
Approximately 10 min after the completion of the study phase, the
test phase was initiated. During the test phase with fMRI scanning,
subjects performed the recognition test, consisting of 4 ‘‘Truth’’ and 4
‘‘Lie’’ blocks. The cues indicating the subsequent ‘‘Truth’’ or ‘‘Lie’’ block
were of 15 s duration and were followed by the target words. In each
‘‘Truth’’ block, 5 ‘‘True targets,’’ 5 ‘‘False targets,’’ and 5 ‘‘New targets’’
were presented in randomized order, and subjects were asked to make
old/new decisions as quickly as possible by pressing keys on the
response box. In each ‘‘Lie’’ block, 5 ‘‘True targets’’ and 5 ‘‘New targets’’
were presented in randomized order, and subjects were asked to make
deceptive responses (i.e., ‘‘new’’ responses for ‘‘True targets’’ and ‘‘old’’
responses for ‘‘New targets’’). Subjects were asked to respond using the
index or middle ﬁnger of their right hand. The assignment of these
ﬁngers for each old/new decision was counterbalanced across blocks.
Each word was presented for 2 s, and the intervals between the words,
during which cross-ﬁxation was constantly presented, ranged between
2.5 s and 13.5 s to maximize the efﬁciency of the event-related design
(Dale 1999).
In 1 test phase with fMRI scanning, participants responded to 20
‘‘True,’’ 20 ‘‘False,’’ and 20 ‘‘New’’ target words in ‘‘Truth’’ blocks, and 20
‘‘True’’ and 20 ‘‘New’’ trials in ‘‘Lie’’ blocks. Thus, across the 2 test
phases, participants responded to 40 ‘‘True,’’ 40 ‘‘False,’’ and 40 ‘‘New’’
target words in ‘‘Truth’’ blocks, and 40 ‘‘True’’ and 40 ‘‘New’’ trials in
‘‘Lie’’ blocks.
Image Acquisition and Data Analysis
Whole-brain imaging was performed with a 1.5-Tesla MRI scanner
(Magnetom Sonata; Siemens, Erlangen, Germany). A T2*-weighted echo
planar imaging (EPI) sequence was used for functional imaging with the
following parameters: time repetition = 2200 ms, time echo = 45 ms,
ﬂip angle = 90,6 43 64 acquisition matrix, ﬁeld of view = 192 mm, 26
axial slices with 4 mm slice thickness and 1 mm interslice gap, 400
volume acquisitions per run. Head motion was restricted using ﬁrm
padding that surrounded the head. The cognitive tasks during fMRI
scanning were controlled using Cogent 2000 software (Wellcome
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were projected onto a screen and viewed through a mirror attached to
a standard head coil. The subjects’ responses were collected using
a magnet-compatible response box.
Data preprocessing and statistical analyses were performed using
Statistical Parametric Mapping 2 (Wellcome Department of Imaging
Neuroscience). Preprocessing of the image volumes included re-
alignment of head motions, slice-time correction with reference to
the middle slice acquired in time, normalization to the EPI-template
based on the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) reference brain
(resampled voxel size 3 3 3 3 3m m
3), and spatial smoothing with
a Gaussian kernel (8 mm at full-width half-maximum).
The fMRI data were analyzed using an event-related model. For each
subject, activity associated with each experimental condition of
interest (i.e., TR, true recognition to ‘‘True targets’’; CR, correct
rejection to ‘‘New targets’’; FR, false recognition to ‘‘False targets’’; LT,
lying to ‘‘True targets’’; LN, lying to ‘‘New targets’’) was modeled using
a canonical hemodynamic response function. Targets that were
incorrectly classiﬁed (i.e., error responses) or for which a response
was omitted were modeled as events of no interest, as were
instructions presented during the onset of ‘‘Truth’’ and ‘‘Lie’’ blocks. A
high-pass ﬁlter of 1/128 Hz was used to remove low-frequency noise,
and an AR (1) model corrected for temporal autocorrelation. The
resulting parameter estimates for each regressor at each voxel were
then entered into a 2nd-level analysis where each participant served
as a random effect in a repeated measures analysis of variance
(ANOVA). Appropriate corrections were made for nonsphericity and
correlated repeated measures (Friston, Glaser, et al. 2002; Friston,
Penny, et al. 2002). The comparisons between experimental conditions
were then performed by appropriately weighted linear contrasts and
determined on a voxel-by-voxel basis. In addition to simple subtraction
analyses, the above procedure allowed us to perform conjunction
analyses at the 2nd level, and we identiﬁed activated regions with
a conjunction using the minimum statistic (Friston et al. 2005), as
suggested by Nichols et al. (2005). This procedure revealed areas in
which all the contrasts entered into conjunction analysis were
individually signiﬁcant. For all the whole-brain subtraction analyses,
the threshold of signiﬁcance was set at P < 0.001 (uncorrected for
multiple comparisons) with an extent threshold of 10 contiguous
voxels. In the conjunction analysis, the same threshold was used (P <
0.001), but no extent threshold was applied. To extract the percent
signal change of activated regions during each task, we also used
MarsBaR software (Brett et al. 2002).
Results
Participants
Before the analysis of imaging data, 2 participants were
excluded from the analysis due to excessive head motion
during fMRI scanning (approximately 4 mm). An additional
6 participants were excluded due to poor task performance
(i.e., less than 60% accuracy in ‘‘Truth’’ blocks, which was close
to chance level) or an insufﬁcient number of events in at least 1
of the conditions used in the imaging contrasts (i.e., fewer
than 15), or both. Thus the results of the present study are
based on the data from the remaining 20 subjects (11 males and
9 females, age range 19--28 years, mean age 21.9 years). These
participants did not report any difﬁculty understanding the task
procedure and performing each of the Truth and Lie tasks as
instructed. There were no pathological ﬁndings on MRI of any
of the subjects’ brains.
Comparison between Truthful and Deceptive Responses
Behavioral Data
All the behavioral data are shown in Table 1. In this analysis, we
used 2-way repeated measures ANOVA to analyze the
behavioral data of 2 ‘‘Truth’’ and 2 ‘‘Lie’’ tasks except for the
Figure 1. Depiction of 1 of the 2 task sessions (see Materials and Methods for details). The study-test phase was conducted twice with different stimulus sets. After
participants heard the word lists of semantic associates in the study phase, they were asked to perform the recognition memory task (test phase) consisting of 4 ‘‘Truth’’ and 4
‘‘Lie’’ blocks with fMRI scanning. In the ‘‘Truth’’ blocks, they were asked to respond honestly to ‘‘True targets’’ (old words from the study phase), ‘‘False targets’’ (nonstudied
words that were semantically related to old words), and ‘‘New targets’’ (new words that were not semantically related to old words). In the ‘‘Lie’’ blocks, they were asked to
dishonestly respond to ‘‘True targets’’ and ‘‘New targets.’’ In the ‘‘Truth blocks,’’ true recognition (TR) was deﬁned as an ‘‘old’’ response to a ‘‘True target,’’ false recognition (FR) as
an ‘‘old’’ response to a ‘‘False target,’’ and correct rejection (CR) as a ‘‘new’’ response to a ‘‘New target.’’ In the ‘‘Lie’’ blocks, lying to ‘‘True targets’’ (LT; i.e., pretending not to
know) and lying to ‘‘New targets’’ (LN; i.e., pretending to know) were deﬁned as deceptive responses to each target.
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or ‘‘New targets’’) was found in the accuracy of the response, as
the average accuracy was signiﬁcantly higher for ‘‘New targets’’
than for ‘‘True targets’’ (F1, 19 = 6.462, P < 0.05). A noticeable
trend of response type (‘‘Truth’’ or ‘‘Lie’’ tasks) qualiﬁed by
a relatively higher accuracy in ‘‘Truth’’ conditions was also
found (F1, 19 = 3.662, P = 0.071). For reaction times, a main
effect of stimulus type was evident, as the average reaction
time was signiﬁcantly longer for ‘‘New targets’’ than for ‘‘True
targets’’ (F1, 19 = 24.034, P < 0.0001). There was also a signiﬁcant
main effect of response type, characterized by a longer reaction
time in ‘‘Lie’’ tasks (F1, 19 = 15.136, P < 0.005). There was no
interaction between the 2 factors in terms of both accuracy
and reaction time. These results indicate that the cognitive
demand in ‘‘Lie’’ tasks was higher than that in ‘‘Truth’’ tasks.
Brain Activation
To examine whether deception was associated with increased
brain activity in the prefrontal cortex, we compared LT and LN
with TR and CR (i.e., main effect of deception). As predicted,
increased prefrontal activations were observed in this contrast.
Table 2 summarizes these data for anatomical structures and
Brodmann’s area (BA), MNI coordinates, Z-values and cluster
size of peak activations.
Second, to examine the inﬂuence of the familiarity of stimuli
on fMRI signals in each activated frontal region and whether or
not an interaction occurred, we performed the region of
interest (ROI) analysis. The signal changes in each cluster were
extracted and analyzed using 2-way ANOVA with the response
to stimuli (‘‘Truth,’’ ‘‘Lie’’) and the familiarity of stimuli (‘‘True
targets,’’ ‘‘New targets’’) as factors. Overall, there was no
signiﬁcant interaction between the 2 factors in the entire
activated regions, indicating that these regions are commonly
associated with the 2 types of deception. Results of the ANOVA
for the right medial prefrontal cortex [12, 57, –6] showed
a signiﬁcant main effect of ‘‘Lie’’ (F1,19 = 18.281, P < 0.0005), but
showed neither a main effect of familiarity of stimuli (F1,19 =
0.629, P = 0.438) nor an interaction between the 2 factors
(F1,19 = 0.075, P = 0.787). ANOVA for the right superior frontal
gyrus [24, 15, 60] yielded similar results: a signiﬁcant main
effect of ‘‘Lie’’ (F1,19 = 24.107, P < 0.0001), without a main
effect of familiarity of stimuli (F1,19 = 1.943, P = 0.179) or an
interaction (F1,19 = 1.805, P = 0.195). Results for the right
middle frontal gyrus [42, 6, 51] showed a signiﬁcant main effect
of ‘‘Lie’’ (F1,19 = 13.112, P < 0.005) and a marginal main effect of
familiarity of stimuli (‘‘True targets’’ > ‘‘New targets’’) (F1,19 =
3.425, P = 0.080), without an interaction (F1,19 = 0.746, P =
0.399). Results for the right superior frontal gyrus [24, –3, 57]
showed a signiﬁcant main effect of ‘‘Lie’’ (F1,19 = 23.866, P <
0.0005), but showed neither a main effect of familiarity of stimuli
(F1,19 = 0.694, P = 0.415) nor an interaction (F1,19 = 0.021, P =
0.886). Results for the left inferior frontal gyrus [–45, 48, –15]
showed a signiﬁcant main effect of ‘‘Lie’’ (F1,19 = 20.538, P <
0.0005), and a main effect of familiarity of stimuli (‘‘True
targets’’ > ‘‘New targets’’) (F1,19 = 10.911, P < 0.005) without an
interaction (F1,19 = 0.002, P = 0.968). Results for the left
supplementary motor area [–12, 21, 57] showed a signiﬁcant
main effect of the ‘‘Lie’’ (F1,19 = 21.678, P < 0.0005) and a
marginal main effect of familiarity of stimuli (‘‘True targets’’ >
‘‘New targets’’) (F1,19 = 4.015, P = 0.060), without an interaction
(F1,19 = 0.179, P = 0.677). Results for the left middle
frontal gyrus [–27, 3, 60] showed a signiﬁcant main effect of
‘‘Lie’’ (F1,19 = 24.276, P < 0.0001), and a main effect of familiarity
of stimuli (‘‘True targets’’ > ‘‘New targets’’) (F1,19 = 12.683, P <
0.005), without an interaction (F1,19 = 0.139, P = 0.713). These
results are illustrated in Figure 2.
Comparison between True and False Recognition
Behavioral Data
In this analysis, we used 1-way repeated measures ANOVA to
examine the behavioral data of TR, FR, and CR. Note that the
accuracy of the task in which participants responded to
nonstudied ‘‘False targets’’ was assessed by the rate of correct
rejection in response to these stimuli. An ANOVA yielded
a signiﬁcant effect of target type in accuracy (F2, 38 = 140.698,
P < 0.0001). A post hoc test (Scheffe) revealed signiﬁcant
differences between true recognition of ‘‘True targets’’ and
correct rejection of ‘‘New targets’’ (P < 0.05), between correct
rejection of ‘‘False targets’’ and correct rejection of ‘‘New
targets’’ (P < 0.0001), and between true recognition of ‘‘True
targets’’ and correct rejection of ‘‘False targets’’ (P < 0.0001). An
ANOVA for reaction time also showed a signiﬁcant effect of
target type (F2, 38 = 13.731, P < 0.0001). A post hoc test
(Scheffe) revealed signiﬁcant differences between TR and CR
Table 1
Percent correct and reaction time for all conditions
Percent correct Reaction time
Mean SD Mean SD
Truth
True targets 71.8 ±8.7 1652 ±351
New targets 81.1 ±9.4 1892 ±417
False targets 28.9 ±12.2 1647 ±370
Lie
True targets 70.6 ±11.4 1959 ±415
New targets 74.8 ±14.3 2168 ±533
Note: The accuracy of subjects’ responses to ‘‘False targets’’ was assessed by the rate of correct
rejection (‘‘new’’ responses), but the reaction time was based on the trials of false recognition
(‘‘old’’ responses).
Table 2
Brain regions showing main effect of making a deceptive responses {(LT   TR) þ (LN   CR)}
Region (BA) MNI coordinates Z value Cluster size
xyz
Rt medial prefrontal cortex (10) 12 57  6 3.86 16
Rt insula 33 21 15 4.13 14
Rt superior frontal gyrus (8) 24 15 60 3.90 11
Rt middle frontal gyrus (6) 42 6 51 3.91 24
Rt superior frontal gyrus (6) 24  3 57 3.81 38
Rt thalamus 15  27 0 4.22 34
Rt fusiform gyrus (19) 24  69  12 3.80 16
Rt cuneus (19) 18  75 39 3.68 44
Lt inferior frontal gyrus (47)  45 48  15 3.58 14
Lt supplementary motor area (6)  12 21 57 4.07 73
Lt insula  30 21 9 3.52 17
Lt insula  48 9 6 3.67 16
Lt middle frontal gyrus (6/8/9)  27 3 60 4.01 140
Lt postcentral gyrus (3)  54  6 39 4.16 22
Lt superior temporal sulcus/superior
temporal gyrus (22)
 42  27 3 3.77 12
Lt supramarginal gyrus (40)  30  42 45 4.00 20
Lt superior parietal lobule (7)  27  57 54 4.12 35
Lt angular gyrus (39)  51  60 36 4.00 38
Lt middle occipital gyrus (19)  30  69 30 3.96 59
Lt precuneus (7)  9  78 45 3.86 49
Note: Only the most signiﬁcant peaks within each area of activation are reported in this table.
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difference was observed between TR and FR (P = 0.996). These
results show a high rate of false recognition of nonpresented
‘‘False targets’’ (approximately 70%). The fact that there was no
difference in reaction time between TR and FR indicates that
the difference in brain activity associated with these processes
cannot be ascribed to retrieval effort.
Brain Activation
Brain activity during TR was compared with that during FR. The
results are shown in Table 3. Consistent with our hypothesis,
activations in the temporal and parietal lobes were found in the
bilateral hemisphere. To obtain more reliable evidence for the
interpretation of sensory reactivation during TR, we performed
conjunction analysis of TR versus FR and TR versus CR. If
the difference between TR and FR were a true reﬂection of
the reactivation of sensory information acquired during the
encoding phase, the observed activations would also be
detected in the contrast of TR versus CR. This conjunction
analysis revealed that the activations in the left temporoparietal
regions during TR relative to FR overlapped with the
activations during TR relative to CR.
To conﬁrm further this activation overlap, we extracted the
signal change in each cluster of 3 left temporoparietal regions
during each condition and analyzed it using 1-way repeated
measures ANOVA. First, results of the ANOVA for the left
superior temporal sulcus/middle temporal gyrus [–48, –9, –15]
showed a signiﬁcant difference (F2, 38 = 9.502, P < 0.001). A
post hoc test (Scheffe) revealed that the activity of TR was
higher than that of CR (P < 0.01) and FR (P < 0.005), whereas
the difference between CR and FR was not signiﬁcant (P =
0.873). Second, results of the ANOVA for the left middle
temporal gyrus [–60, –18, –12] showed a signiﬁcant difference
(F2, 38 = 11.293, P < 0.0005). A post hoc test (Scheffe) revealed
that the activity of TR was higher than that of CR (P < 0.005)
and FR (P< 0.0005), whereas the difference between CR and
FR was not signiﬁcant (P = 0.770). Third, results of the ANOVA
Figure 2. Regions showing greater activation during lying (LT and LN) relative to truth telling (TR and CR). The signal changes of the following 7 activated regions in the frontal
lobe are depicted (error bars represent SEM). (a) Right medial prefrontal cortex [12, 57,  6], (b) right superior frontal gyrus [24, 15, 60], (c) right middle frontal gyrus [42, 6, 51],
(d) right superior frontal gyrus [24,  3, 57], (e) left inferior frontal gyrus [ 45, 48,  15], (f) left supplementary motor area [ 12, 21, 57], (g) left middle frontal gyrus [ 27, 3,
60]. TR, true recognition; CR, correct rejection; LT, lying to ‘‘True targets’’ (pretending not to know); LN, lying to ‘‘New targets’’ (pretending to know).
Table 3
Brain regions showing greater responses during TR compared with FR
Region (BA) MNI coordinates Z value Cluster size
xyz
Rt middle temporal gyrus (21/22) 66  21  3 3.88 24
*Rt/Lt medial superior frontal gyrus (10) 0 60 24 3.53 18
*Rt/Lt cerebellum 0  45  42 3.97 17
*Lt superior temporal sulcus/middle
temporal gyrus (21)
 48  9  15 3.65 11
*Lt middle temporal gyrus (21)  60  18  12 3.88 12
*Lt supramarginal gyrus (40)  51  54 36 3.63 13
Note: Only the most signiﬁcant peaks within each area of activation are reported in this table.
*Indicates the region that includes the active voxels detected in the conjunction analysis of TR
versus FR and TR versus CR.
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a signiﬁcant difference (F2, 38 = 13.688, P < 0.0001). A post
hoc test (Scheffe) revealed that the activity of TR was higher
than that of CR (P < 0.0005) and FR (P < 0.001), whereas the
difference between CR and FR was not signiﬁcant (P = 0.853).
These results are illustrated in Figure 3.
Comparison between Deception and False Memory
Behavioral Data
In the analysis of the difference between deception and false
memory, we used 1-way repeated measures ANOVA to
compare the behavioral data of LN, FR, and CR. As mentioned
above, the accuracy of the condition in which participants
responded to nonstudied ‘‘False targets’’ was assessed by the
rate of correct rejection of these stimuli. An ANOVA yielded
a signiﬁcant effect of accuracy (F2, 38 = 158.569, P < 0.0001). A
post hoc test (Scheffe) revealed signiﬁcant differences between
correct rejection of ‘‘False targets’’ and correct rejection of
‘‘New targets’’ (P < 0.0001), and between lying in response to
‘‘New targets’’ and correct rejection of ‘‘False targets’’ (P <
0.0001). No difference was observed between correct rejection
of ‘‘New targets’’ and lying in response to ‘‘New targets’’ (P =
0.152). An ANOVA for reaction time also showed a signiﬁcant
effect (F2, 38 = 33.483, P < 0.0001). A post hoc test (Scheffe)
revealed that the reaction time for CR was longer than that for
FR (P < 0.005), and that the reaction time for LN was longer
than that for CR (P < 0.001) and that for FR (P < 0.0001). These
data for reaction time indicate that although all the stimuli in
these 3 conditions were novel to the participants, the process
of classifying the stimuli as ‘‘New’’ (i.e., CR) was more
complicated than that of classifying the stimuli as ‘‘Old’’
(i.e., FR). Furthermore, the longer reaction time for LN relative
to that for CR suggests that the additional process of lying
further enhanced cognitive demand during the recognition
memory task.
Brain Activation
Comparison between LN and FR was the main purpose of this
study. First, we compared the neural activities during LN with
those during CR, and found signiﬁcant activations in the
prefrontal cortex. The results are summarized in Table 4. If the
prefrontal activities found in LN versus CR were also detected
in LN versus FR, those regions would be a reliable indicator of
the process of intentional response manipulation characteriz-
ing deception. Conjunction analysis of these 2 contrasts
revealed that activation in the left middle frontal gyrus
detected in LN versus CR overlapped with the activation
detected in LN versus FR.
To further conﬁrm this activation overlap, we extracted the
signal change in the cluster of the left middle frontal gyrus [–42,
18, 39] during each condition and analyzed it using 1-way
repeated measures ANOVA. Results of the ANOVA showed
signiﬁcant difference of signal change in this region (F2, 38 =
13.209, P < 0.0001). A post hoc test (Scheffe) revealed that
the activity of LN was higher than that of CR (P < 0.0001)
and FR (P < 0.05), and a trend was found between CR and FR
(P = 0.092).
As for FR, we compared the neural activities during FR with
those during CR, and found signiﬁcant activation in the right
anterior hippocampus. The results are summarized in Table 5.
If the activations of the medial temporal lobe found in FR
versus CR were also detected in FR versus LN, the region would
be a reliable indicator of illusory familiarity characterizing false
Figure 3. Statistical parametric map of regions showing greater activation during TR
than during CR and FR, displayed on a surface-rendered standard brain. The signal
changes of the following 3 activated regions are depicted (error bars represent SEM).
(a) Left supramarginal gyrus [ 51,  54, 36], (b) left superior temporal sulcus/middle
temporal gyrus [ 48,  9,  15], (c) left middle temporal gyrus [ 60,  18,  12].
TR, true recognition; CR, correct rejection; FR, false recognition.
Table 4
Brain regions showing greater responses during LN compared with CR
Region (BA) MNI coordinates Z value Cluster
size
xy z
Rt superior frontal sulcus (8) 24 15 39 4.37 14
Rt thalamus 18  27 3 3.49 12
Lt supplementary motor area (6)  12 21 54 3.32 11
Lt insula  27 21 12 3.75 16
*Lt middle frontal gyrus (9)  42 18 39 4.25 48
Lt superior frontal sulcus (6)  27 9 42 3.62 11
*Lt supramarginal gyrus (40)  51  57 36 3.68 22
Lt middle occipital gyrus (19)  33  69 33 3.84 12
Note: Only the most signiﬁcant peaks within each area of activation are reported in this table.
*Indicates the region that includes the active voxels detected in the conjunction analysis of LN
versus CR and LN versus FR.
Table 5
Brain regions showing greater responses during FR compared with CR
Region (BA) MNI coordinates Z value Cluster
size
xyz
*Rt basal forebrain/orbitofrontal cortex (12/25) 9 6  9 4.23 35
*Rt hippocampus 36  9  15 3.98 12
*Lt orbitofrontal cortex (11/12)  93 3  18 3.61 25
Lt orbitofrontal cortex (11)  21 27  24 4.28 23
Lt inferior frontal gyrus (45/47)  42 27 0 3.59 15
Lt superior frontal sulcus (8)  24 18 39 3.83 25
Lt insula  27 18 12 4.16 18
Lt caudate nucleus  12 3 9 3.49 15
Lt superior parietal lobule (7)  27  63 54 4.05 43
*Lt cuneus (18)  18  63 21 4.04 127
Note: Only the most signiﬁcant peaks within each area of activation are reported in this table.
*Indicates the region that includes the active voxels detected in the conjunction analysis of FR
versus CR and FR versus LN.
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that the activation in the right anterior hippocampus detected
in FR versus CR overlapped with the activation detected in FR
versus LN.
To conﬁrm further this activation overlap, we extracted the
signal change in the cluster of the right hippocampus [36, –9, –15]
during each condition and analyzed it using 1-way repeated
measures ANOVA. Results of the ANOVA showed signiﬁcant
difference of signal change in this region (F2, 38 = 10.826, P <
0.0005). A post hoc test (Scheffe) revealed that the activity of
FR was higher than that of CR (P < 0.005) and LN (P < 0.001),
whereas the difference between CR and LN was not signiﬁcant
(P = 0.907). In addition, as we expected, the comparison
between FR versus CR revealed no reactivation of the regions
responsible for processing the sensory information of auditorily
presented word lists, such as language-processing areas in the
left hemisphere. The signal change of the activation in the left
middle frontal gyrus and the right hippocampus during each
task is illustrated in Figure 4.
Discussion
In the present study, we aimed to clarify the neural correlates
of true memory, false memory, and deception. As for the
cerebral mechanisms underlying deception, the present data
show that the process of intentional response manipulation in
deception was characterized by prefrontal activity. These
ﬁndings are highly consistent with those of previous neuro-
imaging studies, indicating a robust contribution of executive
function to deception (Spence et al. 2004; Hughes et al. 2005).
Signiﬁcant activations were also detected in the supplementary
motor area, which plays a role in higher motor control (Tanji
1994). This activity may reﬂect motor regulation during button
pressing when making deceptive responses.
In relation to the difference in neural activity between
veridical and illusory memories, the comparison of true
recognition with false recognition revealed activations of the
lateral temporal and parietal cortices. The conjunction analysis
of TR versus FR and TR versus CR, which was performed to
obtain more reliable evidence related to sensory reactivation of
the regions engaged in encoding of the word lists, further
showed left-lateralized activations of the supramarginal gyrus
and the middle temporal gyrus. Previous neuroimaging studies
employing similar word lists of semantic associates for pro-
ducing false recognition have also reported comparable
ﬁndings. For example, Schacter et al. (1996) reported increased
blood ﬂow in the left temporoparietal cortex (BA 42/22/40)
during true recognition relative to false recognition, and
Cabeza et al. (2001) reported a difference in activity in the
left parietal cortex (BA 40/39) between true and false
recognition. Considering the role of the left temporoparietal
areas in the language processing of words presented auditorily,
the left temporoparietal activity can be regarded as a reliable
neural signature of true recognition.
The main purpose of this study was to compare the brain
activity related to the process of pretending to know and false
recognition in order to identify a reliable indicator of the brain
activations associated with each process. We expected that the
activations of the prefrontal cortex detected in the analysis of
LN versus CR would also be detected in the analysis of LN versus
FR, and that the activations of medial temporal lobe responsible
for mnemonic processing detected in the analysis of FR versus
CR would also be detected in the analysis of FR versus LN. To
conﬁrm these predictions, we performed 2 conjunction analyses
(i.e., LN vs. CR conjunct with LN vs. FR, and FR vs. CR conjunct
with FR vs. LN) and ROI analyses for each activation.
As we expected, activation of the left middle frontal gyrus,
possibly reﬂecting the subjective, intentional cognitive process
of response manipulation, was found in the conjunction
analysis of LN versus CR and LN versus FR. The middle frontal
gyrus, often referred to as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex,
can be regarded as a reliable indicator of pretending to know.
Expanding on the previous neuroimaging studies on deception,
our data suggest that prefrontal activity reﬂects not only the
difference between deception and truth telling, but also the
difference between deception and false memory.
Consistent with our hypothesis, conjunction analysis of FR
versus CR and FR versus LN revealed activations of the right
anterior hippocampus without reactivation of the regions
responsible for language processing detected as true recogni-
tion-speciﬁc activity. This activation pattern indicates that the
right anterior hippocampus is associated with ‘‘illusory’’
familiarity to novel stimuli. The results also appear to be
consistent with the recent fMRI ﬁnding that medial temporal
lobe activity is modulated not only by objective memory
function but also by the subjective conﬁdence level of
recognition memory (Chua et al. 2006). One surprising result
was that hippocampal activity was found not in the left but in
the right hemisphere, despite the fact that verbal materials
have to be retrieved. Although it is difﬁcult to explain this
ﬁnding from the available data, there is a possibility that the
right anterior hippocampus plays a role in relatively rough
judgment of episodic familiarity without access to memory
fragments of perceptual traces stored in other cortical areas.
In conclusion, the present fMRI study provided evidence of
neural activities differentiating between true memory, false
memory, and deception. The most important ﬁnding is that the
left prefrontal cortex was activated during pretending to know
relative to both correct rejection and false recognition,
Figure 4. The signal change of increased brain activity in (a) the left middle frontal
gyrus [ 42, 18, 39] during LN in comparison to during CR and FR, and (b) the right
hippocampus [36,  9,  15] during FR in comparison to during CR and LN. Error bars
represent standard error. The activation is superimposed onto MRIs of MNI
templates. CR, correct rejection; FR, false recognition; LN, lying to ‘‘New targets’’
(pretending to know).
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recognition relative to both correct rejection and pretending
to know. Our approach to the comparison between deception
and false memory demonstrated that what someone is
currently thinking can only be judged on the basis of brain
activity, rather than being able to rely on the subject’s
responses (‘‘know’’ in the present study) or the nature of the
stimuli (‘‘novel’’ in the present study).
The limitations of the present study need to be mentioned.
First, the difference between the neural activities associated
with pretending not to know and forgetting (old-miss) could
not be analyzed due to the insufﬁcient number of old-miss
trials. Because these processes, in both of which people
respond ‘‘I don’t know’’ to experienced events, often occur in
various situations such as criminal investigations, it would be
both intriguing and of practical value to clarify the difference
between the neural activities associated with them. Second,
probably because of the challenge inherent in our task, the
subjects’ performance level was relatively low and therefore
the effect of guessing might have inﬂuenced the results.
Methods such as the Remember/Know technique (Tulving
1985), source memory paradigm (Johnson et al. 1993), and
recording the subjects’ conﬁdence level would be beneﬁcial
(e.g., Kim and Cabeza 2007). Third, simulated deception in
laboratory experiments cannot be viewed as being the same as
deception in real life. Replication of the current results in
a more natural situation is warranted. Finally, the results in the
present study cannot reveal whether the subjects tell a lie and
whether the subjects retrieve veridical memory in the level of
individual subject. Further study is needed to decode the brain
activities related to these cognitive processes on a single-
subject, trial-by-trial basis.
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